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Abstract—Growing cybersecurity risks in the power grid
require that utilities implement a variety of security mechanism
(SM) composed mostly of VPNs, firewalls, or other custom
security components. While they provide some protection, they
might contain software vulnerabilities which can lead to a
cyber-attack. In this paper, the severity of a cyber-attack has
been decreased by employing a diverse set of SM that reduce
repetition of a single vulnerability. This paper focuses on the
allocation of diverse SM and tries to increase the security of the
cyber assets located within the electronic security perimeter(ESP)
of a substation. We have used a graph-based coloring game in
a distributed manner to allocate diverse SM for protecting the
cyber assets. The vulnerability assessment for power grid network
is also analyzed using this game theoretic method. An improved,
diversified SMs for worst-case scenario has been demonstrated
by reaching the Nash equilibrium of graph coloring game. As a
case study, we analyze the IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 bus system,
observe the different distributed coloring algorithm for allocating
diverse SM and calculating the overall network criticality.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, Game theory, Nash equilibrium,
Power grid
I. INTRODUCTION
O
VER the past 15 years, the North American bulk power
system has become more prone to the risk of coordinated
High Impact Low Frequency (HILF) cyber attack due to
growing dependency on digital communicating equipment for
substation automation [1]. Concerns for the cybersecurity of
the power network has increased since December 23rd, 2015
when an attacker successfully intruded a Ukrainian substation,
tripped the substation circuit breaker. This resulted in a sub-
stantial blackout [2]. Nowadays, software vulnerabilities have
become major a concern for power grid network. All public
known vulnerabilities are listed in common vulnerabilities and
exposure (CVE) list which require extensive analysis for risk
management process. Recent trend analysis shows that more
than 80% of total vulnerabilities are exploitable by network
access control [3], hence there is a need for increased for
security mechanism standards.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) has introduced the Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) standards to protect the bulk-power system from cyber-
attack. NERC standards include the ESP which is used to
prevent remote intrusion to the sensitive internal system, and
the substation residing within this perimeter. According to
ESP, each substation is to be equipped with a set of security
control mechanisms based on their criticality. Network security
risks such as software exploitation exist in substation automa-
tion due to the lack of security feature (e.g., confidentiality,
authentication,etc.) in communication layer.
It is well documented that having diversity on critical sys-
tems is an important aspect of improving the overall security.
The same idea is extended in the cybersecurity domain where
diversity in the software platforms on a security mechanisms
prevent single point of failure scenarios. However, no research
work has been done in analyzing diversity for grid security.
Without diversity, a single exploited vulnerability on software
exploitation can provide access to multiple substations. Un-
fortunately, the power grid shows a very high level of homo-
geneity where each substation relies on the limited number of
vendors to build their security infrastructure. It is thus possible
for an attacker to travel across the entire power network
and reduce the system-level robustness given by traditional
planning and operational criteria. This propagation behavior
of a cyber-attack can be minimized by utilizing diverse SM.
In this manner, an attack requires more exploits/resources.
The game theoretical approaches are used for modeling
and analyzing network behavior across the network where
players compete for finite resources [4]. In our paper, network
security heterogeneity has been achieved by using a combina-
torial optimization polymatrix graph coloring game. Work by
Chaudhuri [8] first introduced the theoretical background of
a network coloring game. Based on Chaudhuri, we propose a
graph coloring game that assigns a limited number of software
packages based on their security strength (Action: color) to a
set of SM (Player: node) under some constraints (Strategies),
such as there exists an increase in the security (Payoff: security
index) of the cyber assets to the entire power grid network. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) Introduce a graph based security model (section IV)
where the diversity of SM is achieved by using graph
coloring game (section V).
2) The security index of each SM is designed by trading
off between vulnerabilities of the substation and security
strength of that mechanism.
3) A graph coloring game is proposed to identify an
optimal software package allocation decision that en-
sures the highest level security and reduce the attack
propagation of overall power grid network.
II. RELATED WORK AND OVERVIEW OF CYBER
PROTECTION ON THE POWER GRID
A. Related work
Multiple new metrics have been proposed to determine
the security risks of a power grid system [23][24]. A work
that analyzes common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS)
metric against actual attack in the controlled environment is
2proposed in [12]. However, none of those metrics considered
the diversity of SM on the power grid by considering the
defensive strategies.
The use of diversity on SM has gained much attention
as an important security property [13]. Diversity on SM
deployment strategies for resilience has been evaluated [7]
and has been found to improve the robustness [6] of the
network against zero-day attack by introducing a network
security metric. Previously, multiple studies have been per-
formed that study survivability through heterogeneity. Source
code modification [14] [15] had been proposed to diversify
the software packages on computer systems. Keromytis and
Prevelakis [16] modified the environment and structure of the
network to achieved the diversity against system monocultures.
In [17], the authors proposed a distributed graph coloring
algorithm which leverages a malicious node to attack the
same software packages, this resulted in software diversity.
This work focuses on topological properties of the computer
network which is similar to the concepts [5] of preventing
human behavior epidemics on social relations.
Recently, game theory has been applied to the distributed
algorithm to achieve the proper allocation of resources in
cloud computing [18], peer-to-peer system [19] and web
cache [20]. Papagopoulou and Spirakas [21] proposed theo-
retical background of efficient graph coloring game which was
based on local search. In [22], the authors proposed a game-
theoretic approach of vertex coloring in a distributed manner
for evaluating the performance of the wireless network in a
simulated environment.
In this paper, Our work emphasizes on interdependency, the
complex network where a system-wide study of diversity has
not yet performed. We focused on the heterogeneity of SM in
the substation to reduce the propagation of computer malware.
B. Overview of cyber protection
The Cyber assets in power system always try to maintain
some level of protection strategies; there are remaining ques-
tions of how to diversify the set of SM that most accurately
reflect the grid’s risk. There exists some challenges to achieve
a strong defense mechanism for the substation against a cyber-
attack. Those challenges are include the management of secu-
rity keys, poor authentication, and authorization mechanism,
fragile legacy devices and unpatched systems. It is mandatory
to defend the substation by hardening the interior of operation
network and also harden the field sites and their partner
connections. By hardening, we are able to limit the dispersal of
single point vulnerabilities and diminish the attacker capability
to expand a compromise the entire system.
As an example, In NERC, all the critical cyber assets require
that all ESP substations that have been classified as either
high/medium or low to provide isolation between untrusted
network and substation. NERC CIP-005-5 standard addresses
identification and protection of all electronic access point on
ESP [25]. The ESP depends on security mechanisms and pro-
tected by an electronic access point (EAP) that allows routable
communication between cyber assets. According to NERC
CIP-005-05, high/medium ESP substations required additional
security requirement such as multi-factor authentication and
encryption to protect the remote interactive sessions. Figure
1 provides an overview of the required protection strategies
in both ESP and LESP strategies, demonstrating the SMs to
protect both interactive and SCADA communication sessions.
Fig. 1: Example substation protection architecture
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose the cyber-physical framework
where the game-theory is applied to achieve the diversity
of SM related to protection of cyber assets at substation.
This cyber-physical framework is modeled as a graphical
representation named Security Graph,M . It considers all
possible attack paths that an attacker could use to access
and manipulate the substation. We explore various distributed
algorithms in Diversity Graph,G. G is extracted from M
that captures only SMs installed for substation protection. Fig
2 shows the proposed approach to achieve diversity on SM.
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Fig. 2: Modeling of achieve diversity using game theory
A. Physical system criticality
We assume an intruder attempt to seek strategies to find
out the most critical substations and tries to manipulate those
substations control parameter to cause damage as much as
possible. Hence, from power utility perspective, the most
critical substation need to be identified and equipped with
well protection devices to protect from cyberattack. In our
proposed method, we categorized the substations into high
impact substation(HIS) and low impact substation(LIS) based
on their criticality. To achieve this, we have used the impact
factor calculation [9]. The IEEE common data (e.g.bus data,
branch data) format is applied to calculate impact factor.
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Fig. 3: Security Graph Model
The author in [9] introduced the impact factor metrics, γ
which applies to the analysis of the cyber attack on substations.
This impact factor represents the impact of the removal of a
single-, double- or multiple- substation from the entire power
system by switching it off due to a cyber attack. This impact
factor is defined as follows:
γ =
(
Plol
Ptotal
)L∗−1
(1)
In this equation, L∗ represents the maximum loading level
value, where the power flow study diverges. This loading level,
L is achieved by performing the continuation power flow
methods (i.e., P − V curve analysis). Here, Plol and Ptotal
represents the loss of load and total system load respectively.
In this method, substations are designated as the highest level
of criticality whose impact factor, γ = 1 and designated as
critical if their impact factor is greater than threshold. System
planners have their own impact level threshold based on their
security level responsiveness and willingness to invest. If the
substation impact factor γ is more than this threshold level,
then this substation is classifies as HIS.
B. Cyber model
The cyber system modeled as a security graph model,
M = (C,K) where C is the set of cyber assets and k is the
networking link connecting them. The cyber assets include,
the SMs, the substation protection equipment (e.g., circuit
breaker, relay), and the attacker. We define a set of SMs,
S ∈ {V PN, encryption, authentication, firewall} used to
protect protection equipment and connected networks K . M
is developed with the following principles: (i) some security
mechanisms are used to protect SCADA communication, and
(ii) that multiple SMs could be implemented in a single device,
and (iii) that substations are interconnected, i.e. to support
transfer trip relay messages between connected substations,
and (iv) that other substation devices (e.g., RTUs, relays) do
not implement any SM. An example M is presented in Fig. 3,
it is modeled based on the substation protection architecture
shown in Fig. 1 where HIS and LIS are both connected to
each other through VPN. A example set of SMs for M can be
outlined as follows:
1) SCADA firewall (SfwH , SfwL)
2) VPN (Svpn1, Svpn2)
3) System firewall (Local) (Sfw11, Sfw21, Sfw1)
4) System Authentication (Svpn22, Svpn12, Svpn23)
TABLE I: Attack path analysis
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From this M , we need to extract G for further analysis.
G is based on the connection of the SMs. As we mentioned
before our goal is to diverse the SM . Hence, In this work, we
focus only on the vertices which represent the SM.
C. Threat model
We need to construct our power grid network by utilizing
a diverse set of SMs so that a malware will not propagate
across the entire network by preventing single point of failure.
We developed our threat model by making the following
assumption:
1) A threat is modeled against k zero-day attacks proposed
by [7] where k is the number of unique vulnerabilities.
2) A software vulnerability exists such that it compromises
all the devices where this software is installed .
3) The protected system should have diversity x greater or
equal than the attacker’s capability to attack n security
mechanism located in attack path p.
Diversity, x = #colors(p)
s.t. ∃p|p ∈ G
| k |< x ≤| n | ∀p ∈ G
Consider, a simple scenario where the attacker is able to
move from one node to another node by using the network.
First, consider a case where each type of SMs are running
the same software package (i.e.color) (Fig 3). In this case,
the attacker can easily compromise substation 2 by exploiting
Sfw1 and Svpn22 as their neighbor SM is running the same set
of software packages. It clearly indicates a lack of diversity
and a need for replacing this software arrangement to prevent
malware from propagating to other network systems all at
once. As a mitigation proposal, we have installed a different
set of software packages so that neighbor node not running the
same software packages. In this case, we have alloted green,
yellow and black color to represent Svpn23, Sfw1, and Svpn1,
respectively. Now, let us assume that an attacker wants to
access either substation 1 or substation 2 or both by exploiting
k− different types of software packages. Table I shows the
number of exploited software(k), and feasible attack path to
access the substation. By analyzing this penetration problem,
we conclude that the diversity will create difficulties for an
attacker to attack on the cyber assets across the entire network
by reducing the number of attack path.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
We applied different distributed coloring algorithms in our
diversity graph to achieve diversification of the SM. The goal
is to allocate software packages to the SM in such a way that
neighboring node should not run the same software package.
4Each of the software packages are represented by color and
associated with an integer value based on security strength
variable, where a higher integer value is regarded as being a
highly secured software allocated to the SM.
In the distributed coloring algorithm, let, G = (V, E) be
a finite, undirected diversity graph with |V | = n vertices.
Where, N(v) := {w ∈ V ; (v, w) ∈ E} denotes the set of
neighbor nodes for v ∈ V . Each vertex has a set of x colors
that represents actions [X ] = {1, ..., x}. The algorithm goal is
to choose a profile c = (cv)v∈V ∈ X
n from the combination
of actions in set X , where c is an integer value of color chosen
by vertex. The least number of colors required for coloring the
entire graph is referred as chromatic number (χ).
A. Graph Coloring Game
In this paper, we propose a graph coloring game where each
vertex v in G acts as a player who needs to the choose a color
according to different strategies. A player payoff is defined as
the security index Uv(c) which evaluates the vulnerability. The
overall game is played in rounds where each player chooses
a color in each round according to their strategies and by
observing the colors chosen by neighbors. If a player is able to
choose a color different from the colors used by its neighbors
players, then it is Satisfied; otherwise, it is Unsatisfied. If
the player reaches an unsatisfied state then it most choose
another color such as that it becomes satisfied. This processes
is repeated until all the players become Satisfied, then our
graph coloring game reaches its Nash equilibrium. In the next
paragraph, a set of more formal rules are given:
The graph coloring game Γ(G) is a game of strategic form
where the set of vertices V refers as set of the players, and
Each of the player v ∈ V needs to choose a pure strategy
profile c from action set X based on his strategies. Assume,
p denotes the type of security mechanism (e.g.VPN, firewall,
etc.)
The payoff of a vertex in our game depends on the security
index that is defined as,
Uv(c) =
∑
w∈N(v) |c(v) ∗Ψ(v)− c(w) ∗Ψ(w)| (2)
where, Ψ is the vulnerability of the SM. For a set of SM
located in an substation Z , the security mechanism vulnera-
bility Ψ(v) of SM v is referred as potential damage over that
substation, Z .
Ψ(v) = pipv × γ(Z) (3)
where pipv is the likelihood that a substation is attacked through
a specific security mechanism p. This security index Uv(c)
measures the complexity of the cyber attack that is required
to exploit the vulnerability once an attacker has gained access
to the target security mechanism v.
The above-mentioned security index, Uv(c) identifies the
critical SM by considering both the physical impact (vul-
nerability index) and the difficulty of cyberattack(security
strength). For example, if an SM has the same vulnerability
index as the neighborhood SM, then Uv depends on the
difference of the security strength between SMs. The lower
the Uv of node v, the higher the vulnerability of that security
mechanism. In this game, the player v needs to choose an
appropriate security mechanism to maximize its security index
given by (2).
The normalization in (2) put Uv into the same level ((0,10)
range) which improve indices integrity and makes it conve-
nient for the further criticality analysis over different electric
power system.
Uv[0,10] =
Uvi − U
v
min
Uvmax − U
v
min
(4)
Also, we calculate a cumulative security index, σ =∑n
i=1 U
i(c) which indicates how secure system is by deter-
mining the diversity of the graph. The higher the σ, the less
critical the components are to the power grid network.
Proper coloring in our game results in the pure Nash
equilibrium. Our coloring game reaches Nash equilibrium
when all the SM successfully allocates the software packages
based on their strategies. In this Nash equilibrium, no player
should change their payoff by unilateral deviating.
Definition 1. Our security mechanism allocation X∗ is said to
be pure Nash equilibrium if Uv(X
∗
v , X
∗
−v) ≤ Uv(Xv, X
∗
−v),
∀v ∈ n, ∀Xv ∈ X . Here X
∗
−v refers the software allocated of
all the player except that vth vertices.
Definition 2. Every pure Nash equilibrium is a proper coloring
of graph G.
Definition 3. [10] For every player v and cv, c
′
v ∈ X and any
c−v their exists a generalized ordinal potential function φ(.)
which we have,
Uv(cv, c−v)− U
v(c′v, c−v) > 0
⇒ φ(cv, c−v)− φ(c
′
v, c−v) > 0
(5)
This generalized ordinal potential function admits that our
graph coloring game has at least one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium [11].
Our graph coloring game is developed based on some
strategies. All the strategies play an important role in making
our game more solvable and meaningful. These strategies set
the rules for a player on how to play the game. All the
strategies for game are given below :
• Bound on the number of colors:We have a limited number
of available software packages i.e. colors. The maximum
possible colors available for the game is ∆2(G) + 2. Here,
∆ is the degree of a vertices.
x ≤ (∆2(G) + 2) (6)
lemma 1., The total number of colors x satisfies x ≤ ∆2(G)+
2 for any pure Nash equilibrium of Γ(G) and hence x ≤
∆(G) + 2.
Proof: Let us consider, x is the total number of colors required
to achieve a pure Nash equilibrium c of Γ(G). If x = 1, then
graph G is disconnected and therefor ∆(G) = ∆2(G) = 0.
Now assume, three colors xi, xj , xk ∈ X are assigned to the
graph to color minimum number of vertices. According to
Def.2, assume that nxi(c) ≥ nxj(c) ≥ nxk ≥ nx(c) for all
colors x 6∈ {xi, xj , xk} used in proper coloring c. Let, the
vertex v and her neighbors w assigned the color xi and xj ,
respectively. The payoff of that vertex v is Uv(c) = |xi(v) ∗
Ψ(v) − xj(w) ∗ Ψ(w)|. Let us assume that there is no edge
5between v and w with cw = xk. Then according to Nash
equilibrium, v must hold that nxi(c) ≥ nx(c) + 2. So, the
degree of vertex v is the total number of color minus 2, i.e.
∆(v) ≥ x− 2.
• Ordering sequence: We ordered our vertices v by consid-
ering the worst-case scenario and this scenario is achieved by
choosing a vertex v with maximum criticality, then order the
remaining vertices. Figure 5 shows the algorithm for ordering
sequence strategy. In this algorithm, M denotes the set of
the security mechanism types, pi. Each of the pi ∈ M
had v number of security mechanisms located on different
substations. To make the ordering sequence more feasible, we
have considered the degree of each SM.
Fig. 4: Ordering sequence strategy
• Coloring sequence: Each vertex v needs to choose a
strategy profile c from a set of x colors. We consider that
the strategy profile c for a specific color is represented by an
integer located between 1− 10. As we mentioned before that
the higher value of c represents a highly secured software
allocated to the SM. Our coloring sequence strategy is set
in such a way that all important SMs found in the ordering
sequence strategy can get a higher priority color. This is
equivalent to say that the most critical substations have the
most secure software combinations.
B. Comparison with non-strategic distributed algorithms
We have explored different distributed coloring algorithms
that try to efficiently allocate SMs on the diversity graph.
Based on the results there exists some strategical differences
between our proposed graph coloring game and other dis-
tributed coloring algorithms. The main difference with other
distributed coloring algorithms is that they did not consider
any worst-case scenario and the physical repercussions of their
coloring schemes.
1) Randomized coloring: In this algorithm, each node v
randomly chooses a color from a given list of colors. The
number of given color for each node is d(v) + 1 where,
d(v) is the degree of node v. This algorithm proceeds in
certain rounds and each round, every node randomly picks
a color from their given list. Then, they check whether their
neighbors pick the same color or not. Any conflict-free node
keeps its colors and halt. A node with conflicts withdraw their
color, remove that color from their list and continue.During
the execution of randomized algorithm, all vertices terminated
within O(logn) rounds. Figure 6 demonstrates the randomized
coloring algorithm.
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Fig. 5: Randomized coloring algorithm
2) Generic greedy coloring: In this algorithm, we color the
vertices of the graph based on the order of degree. We consider
the degree (connectivity) as fundamental property to guarantee
the resiliency of a network [27]. In this algorithm, we ordered
our SMs according to the descending order of degree. This
greedy algorithm is used to find the upper bound of the
chromatic number by using Brooks theorem. This algorithm
states that if we order the vertices in descending order based
on their degree (d), then chromatic number is, ζ = d+1. The
time complexity of this algorithm increases O(n2) in each
round. Figure 7 shows the generic greedy coloring algorithm.
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Fig. 6: Generic greedy coloring algorithm
3) Sequential coloring: A sequential coloring algorithm of
graph G operating in the following two stages: (i) Determine
a coloring sequence K = (v1, v2, ....., vn) of vertices in G
according to the order of the substation and (ii) pick a color
randomly from a list of colors and check whether the neighbor
nodes have same color or not. The time complexity of this
algorithm is O(1) in each round.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this paper, the IEEE-14 bus and IEEE-118 bus test case
system has been used to evaluate our proposed graph coloring
algorithm vs non-strategic distributed algorithms. But mostly
our result focus on the analysis of IEEE-14 bus system.
To model our diversity graph G, first, we need to develop
the security graph M on cyber-physical topology. To do
this, we need to identify the most critical substations by
performing the impact factor calculation. This impact factor
metrics is achieved by performing continuation power flow
under normal operating condition. Table II shows the impact
factor calculation of the IEEE-14 bus system with γ = 0.25
as a threshold value to differentiate between HIS and LIS. The
list of HISs and LISs for IEEE-14 bus system are:
Subshigh = (2, 3, 4) and Subslow = (1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
6(a) Randomized coloring algorithm (b) Greedy coloring algorithm
(c) Sequential coloring algorithm (d) Graph coloring game
Fig. 7: Different distributed coloring algorithm on diversity graph of IEEE-14 bus system
Then, we modeled our security graph M for the IEEE-14
bus system based on the assumption proposed in section III-B.
Next, we extracted the diversity graph G from M which was
only based on the connectivity of SMs.
We have assumed steady-state probabilities for intrusion
scenarios of pi to calculate the vulnerabilities. In Table III,
we prioritize each pi from top-to-bottom order based on their
security strength. As the security strength increases, it is less
probable to attack. Hence, The attack likelihood pi is assumed
in such fashion.
In this work, we had assumed that there exists a lim-
ited number of software packages(color) to diversify the
SM and each of those assigned a certain integer value
based on their security strength. The integer value as-
signed to available color for IEEE-14 bus system is, c =
{Green,Blue,Red, Purple, Y ellow} ⇐⇒ {10, 8, 6, 4, 2}
Finally, we apply the different distributed algorithm in G
and calculate the payoff (security index) of each SM. Figure
8(a), 8(b), 8(c) and 8(d) show diversity graph G of IEEE-14
bus system after applied the randomized coloring algorithm,
generic greedy coloring algorithm, sequential coloring algo-
rithm and graph coloring game, respectively.
A. Scenario Analysis
In this section, two possible scenarios had been analyzed
in IEEE-14 bus system to show how the optimal diversity
had been achieved from graph coloring game by: (i) reducing
the attack propagation and (ii) increasing the security of the
network.
TABLE II: Impact factor calculation of IEEE 14-bus system
Sub. Associated
Bus
LOL(MW) L∗ Impact
factor(γ)
1 1 0.5 3.00 0.000071
2 2 5 1 1.0
3 3 94.24 3.059 0.2427
4 4,7,8,9 29.50 1 1.0
5 5,6 11.20 1.8 0.1050
6 10 9.00 3.066 0.0019
7 11 3.5 3.062 0.00027
8 12 6.1 3.04 0.00092
9 13 13.5 3.059 0.0044
10 14 14.9 3.066 0.0053
TABLE III: Steady State Probabilities for Security Mechanism
Attack start from Security Mechanism pi
SCADA firewall SfwH , SfwL 0.1
VPN Svpn1, Svpn2 0.2
System firewall Sfw11 , Sfw21 , Sfw1 0.5
System authentication Svpn22, Svpn12, Svpn23 0.8
1) Reduce attack propagation: Let us consider a scenario
where the attacker wants to take control of the most critical
substation 2 within a limited capability, k. The attacker can
access the SM whose strategy profile integer value c is equal
or less than k. Here, we assume the attacker capability, k = 8.
This scenario assumes substation connectivity incorporate with
loss of load and mapping of color. The attacker is able to take
control of substation 2 by accessing either the SCADA firewall
(2SfwH), VPN (2Svpn2) or system firewall (2Sfw1). After
accessing 2SfwH and 2Sfw1, It is possible for an attacker to
propagate the attack, as substation 2 is connected to substation
7TABLE IV: Total loss of load on accessing substation 2 of
IEEE-14 bus system
Distributed
Algorithm
Access security
mechanism
Attack
start
from
Attack
propa-
gate
Total Plol
(MW )
Coloring game 2SfwH , 2Sfw1 - - 5.0
Greedy 2SfwH , 2Sfw1,
2Svpn2
1,3,4,5 1,3,4,5 140.44
Sequential 2Svpn2 1,5 - 16.70
Random 2Svpn2 1,3,4, - 129.24
TABLE V: Security index analysis of IEEE-14 bus system for
different attack scenarios
Scenario: Attack on Entry points, i (SM) 
? ????????????????????? ? ? ???????? ???????????
Game Sequential Greedy Random 
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1, 3, 4 and 5. Also, the attacker needs to take control other
substations first in order to access 2Svpn2.
Table IV shows total loss of load of IEEE-14 bus system
when an attacker gets access to substation 2 with his limited
capabilities under different distributed coloring algorithm. In
this table, column III represents which substations need to
be compromised before accessing substation 2 and column
IV represents which other substations had been affected by
accessing substation 2. From fig. 8(d), it was observed that the
color assigned by neighbor nodes of 2SfwH and 2Sfw1 are
green whose security strength integer value is c = 10. Hence,
the attacker can take control the substation 2 by accessing both
SCADA firewall and system firewall but not able to propagate
his attack into other substations due to his limited capabilities.
But by using other traditional coloring algorithm, the attacker
is able to access the substation 2 and propagate his attack to
other substations. From table IV, it concluded that a graph
coloring game reduces attack prorogation and minimizes loss
of load by allocating appropriate software packages to the
security mechanism.
2) Increase the security: We analyze different scenarios
of cyber-attack in single and multiple substation on IEEE-14
bus system to show how the diversity provided by the graph
coloring game introduced difficulty for an attacker to access
the entry point SMs of the substation. In all the scenarios, the
attacker tries to get access of the SMs located on the entry
point of the substation. Next, we calculated the security index
of each SM for different distributed coloring algorithm by
using Eq.2. According to Table V, for all the scenarios, the
proposed graph coloring game allocates the most secure SMs
for protection against a cyber-attack.
B. Result analysis
We have compared different distributed coloring algorithm
by analyzing the attacker behavior against k vulnerabilities on
IEEE-118 bus system; and also by calculating the cumulative
security index(σ) for the entire diversity graph. The compar-
ison of different distributed coloring algorithm is shown in
Table VI. In this table, column IV and column V represents
the number of color and which color required to diverse the
entire graph, respectively. Column V I represents the number
of unique vulnerabilities. For example, in graph coloring game,
k = 1 describes an attacker able to access all the entry point
SMs those are allocated with color red.
From this table VI, for each algorithm, we had observed
that when the maximum k vulnerabilities is equal to diversity,
then the attacker is able to take control the entire network
by accessing all the SMs. Even though the diversity is same
for the graph coloring game and the sequential algorithm, the
diversity of SM in the graph coloring game makes the network
more secure. This hinders the attacker capability to propagate
the malware.
The greedy coloring algorithm and the randomized coloring
algorithm is able to diverse the entire network by using the
least number and the most number of colors, respectively. But
the cumulative security index(σ) for greedy coloring algorithm
is comparatively lower than other algorithm that implies the
least secure allocation strategy of SMs. For the graph coloring
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Fig. 8: First ten highest security index Uv SM for different
distributed algorithms
game, we observed that the cumulative security index is higher
than all other distributed algorithms. Hence, this algorithm
give the best possible software package allocation in each SM
for IEEE-14 bus power grid network.
Figure 9 shows the first ten high security index SMs of
IEEE-14 bus system outputted by different distributed coloring
algorithms. From this figure, we observed that most of the
high-security index SMs are located in HIS rather than LIS, If
an attacker get access the HIS, he can cause more damage
than accessing the LIS. Hence, the security index of SM
located in the HIS is higher by allocating more secure diverse
SM. According to the prioritization list, SCADA Firewall
(SfwH , SfwL) is more critical than VPN (Svpn1, Svpn2). But
according to security graph, if an attacker can access an VPN,
he/she can also get access other substation which will cause
most severe damage. Therefore, the VPN needs the most
secure software combination to reduce the criticality of the
entire network. From, figure 9, we also observed that the
security index of the VPN located in substation 4 is the highest
which indicates that the most secure software is allocated to
this SM.
VI. CONCLUSION
The security mechanism located within a ESP of an sub-
station needs to be heterogeneous in order to increase the
8TABLE VI: Comparison of different distributed coloring algorithm for IEEE-118 bus system
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security of cyber assets in power grid network against a single
shared software vulnerabilities. In this paper, we have applied
different distributed coloring algorithms in our diversity graph
to increase the effectiveness of SM heterogeneity. Among all
the algorithms, the proposed graph coloring game provides the
best diversity by increasing the security index and improving
the attack tolerance of our power grid network. This security
index can be used to minimize malware propagation and
reduce loss of load, Plol. In this analysis of the diversity prob-
lem, our model formulation is limited to defensive investment
that leads to a additive level of expenditure by utilities. In
future, we like to extend the study of diversity by introducing
a new metrics that consider defensive investment too.
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